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TAGS: [PTER](#) [ASEC](#) [KCRM](#) [EFIN](#) [KHLs](#) [KPAO](#) [KU](#) [TERRORISM](#)
SUBJECT: KUWAIT: 2005 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT DRAFT

REF: STATE

¶1. (U) Embassy Kuwait's submission for the 2005 Terrorism Report is provided below. The text will also be submitted electronically as instructed in reftel. Addendum information will be provided septel. Post contact is Political Officer Andrea F. Gastaldo who can be reached at GastaldoAF2@state.gov.

¶2. (U) Begin text:
Kuwait continued to engage with the U.S. Government and with its neighbors to thwart domestic threats to Kuwait and foreign interests. It also continued to provide support to U.S. efforts to stem terror financing. Following four separate police actions against terrorists in January 2005 -- which resulted in the deaths of four police officers and eight terrorists -- the Government of Kuwait strengthened domestic counterterrorism efforts, but the potential for future attacks remains a serious concern. While the Government of Kuwait is a strong ally of the U.S. and verbally supportive of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Kuwait, the Government is reluctant to confront extremist elements within the local population and continues to temper its measures against terrorists with long-time practices of co-optation to maintain domestic stability.

The Kuwaiti Government has taken measures to bolster security and enhance protection for Coalition Forces transiting Kuwait. Kuwait State Security (KSS) has worked to identify and arrest terror suspects and thirty-seven defendants are standing trial for terrorist activities stemming from January's police actions. The Public Prosecutor claims that insufficient and incomplete evidence has hampered the conviction of many suspected terrorists in the past. Twenty of the 37 defendants are facing the death penalty if convicted of terrorism charges but eleven of them are fugitives, their whereabouts unknown. In a separate case, the May 2005 trial of "Jihadists in Iraq" resulted in convictions of 22 men; their three-year jail sentences are being appealed on the grounds that they are "too harsh." The 22 were convicted of recruiting juveniles to fight U.S. forces in Iraq and collecting money to send to insurgents in Iraq. Others sentenced to jail for recruiting, supporting, or being a terrorist have often had their sentences suspended or commuted to a nominal fine. Kuwaiti law lacks strong provisions to deal effectively with those engaged in conspiracy to commit terrorist acts and in the past, there have been instances of individuals involved in terrorist cells receiving relatively light sentences for involvement in acts of violence.

As part of its campaign against terror, the Kuwaiti Government re-enacted search laws to allow for police entry into private homes and vehicles in order to search for weapons. The search law was first passed in 1991 directly after the first Gulf War but had not been used since 1994. In addition, in November the Government of Kuwait increased

the penalties for illegal ownership of weapons, increasing the penalty for light firearms from five to ten years, and for automatic firearms from seven to fifteen years in jail. The GOK has also instituted more elaborate camera surveillance of borders and critical infrastructure.

A ministerial committee formed in October 2004 and chaired by the Minister of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs to develop strategies to combat terror and extremists began holding conferences in the Spring 2005 to promote moderation and tolerance in youth. The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs also worked with the Ministry of Information to shut down some "weblogs" which encouraged extremist ideology and is working on a long-term plan to combat terrorism and extremist ideology through an outreach program targeting Kuwaiti youth. The Islamic bloc has continued to be critical of the Government's methods in confronting and dealing with extremists and some Members of Parliament stated that the police actions of January should have dealt with the terrorists via an approach based on Islamic reasoning and re-education rather than through violent confrontation.

Following the December 6, 2004 attack on U.S. Consulate General Jeddah, the Government of Kuwait augmented security around U.S. installations in Kuwait. In addition, Kuwait responded quickly to U.S. concerns about a possible terror attack in January 2005, reviewing security and initiating a search for the individuals believed to be the source of the threats. Kuwaiti officials have also heightened security along their border with Iraq and signed a security pact with the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior in December 2005 to prevent militant infiltration and terrorist transnational movement. The Kuwaiti Government regularly patrols its waterways for smugglers and illegal immigrants and routinely

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deports them back to their countries of origin.

The Kuwaiti Government has also begun a DNA database sampling of all of its residents. Currently, the Government has used its prison population as its baseline and has DNA samples and dental records of all of its prisoners, both male and female. In addition, it is recording fingerprint records for all third-country nationals who apply for a residency permit. The Ministry of Interior's Crime Lab expects the process to take two to three years to be completed.

Earlier this year Kuwait implemented terrorist fund freezes in accordance with U.N. designations. In the spring, the Government froze the assets of Mohsen Al-Fadhli, a known Kuwaiti terrorist who is a fugitive from justice, after receiving the UN directive which put Al-Fadhli on its terror finance watchlist. As part of its broader CT efforts focusing on combating the financing of terrorism and anti-money laundering (CTF/AML), the Government of Kuwait established a ministerial committee to revise and strengthen the country's existing anti-money laundering law with the objective of criminalizing terrorism finance and strengthening internal policies and procedures. The revised legislation is expected to be finalized for review and approval by the Council of Ministers (cabinet) and the National Assembly in 2006. In addition, Kuwait Customs, in conjunction with U.S. Customs, held a four-day conference in December 2005 on anti-terror financing in Kuwait. Over 130 participants from all over Kuwait received training on how to identify and stop the flow of terror financing in their financial institutions and elsewhere. Nevertheless, Kuwaiti government efforts to stem the flow of private donations from Kuwait to jihadists in Iraq have been inadequate. There is no effective enforcement of laws governing the transfer and physical transport of currency into Kuwait and the country has no cash exit declaration policy.

In early 2005, several members of the Kuwait Armed Forces were implicated in an alleged plot against a U.S. camp in Kuwait. Subsequently, the Kuwait Armed Forces began

developing internal programs designed to reduce the threat of
extremism in its ranks.

Kuwait is party to eleven of the twelve international
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Kuwait has
signed but has not yet ratified the 1999 Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

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<http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/>

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